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DEDICATED TO OLAF PEDERSEN ON THE OCCASION OF 
THE BEGINNING OF HIS EIGHTH DECADE 
Traditionally, the Greek mathematical term djnamis is interpreted alternately as “square” 
and “root/side of square.” A survey of the usages of the term and of the related verb 
djnasthai by Plato, Aristotle, and various mathematical authors including EudemoslHippoc- 
rates, Euclid, Archimedes, Hero, Diophantos, and Nicomachos shows that all are compatible 
with a familiar concept of Babylonian mathematics, the square identified by (and hence with) 
its side. It turns out that a “geometers’ d$namis” and a “calculators’ dynamis” must be 
differentiated; that the technical usage for the former became fixed only around the mid- 
fourth century B.C.; and that it vanished except in specific connections and formulaic 
expressions by the third century. Along with the conceptual congruity, the Babylonian and 
Greek terms share a number of everyday connotations. This suggests that the Greek concept 
may have been inspired or borrowed from the Near East. This hypothesis can be neither 
proved nor disproved directly by the sources, but it is internally coherent and fruitful with 
regard to the existing material. 8 IWO Academic press, hc. 
La tradition interprete ahemativement le terme mathematique grec dynamis comme 
“carre” et “racine car&e”. Un aper$u sur les modes d’emploi du terme grec chez Platen, 
Aristote, et chez un nombre de mathdmaticiens (dont EudtmelHippocrate, Euchde, Archi- 
m&de, Heron, Diophante, et Nicomaque) fait pourtant voir que I’on peut comprendre tous 
ces modes d’emplois a partir d’un concept familier aux mathematiques babyloniennes, a 
savoir le car& identifit par (et done avec) son c&C. I1 s’ensuit aussi qu’il faut distinguer entre 
la “d$namis des geombtres” et la “dynamis des calculateurs”; que l’usage du premier ne 
devient fixe qu’au milieu du quatritme siecle avant J.-C; et qu’il disparait du discours 
geometrique courant a partir du troisieme siecle avant J.-C. et n’est conserve que dans 
des contextes specifiques. Le contenu conceptuel commun et I’existence de connotations 
secondaires partagees suggerent la possibilitt d’un emprunt du concept. Cette hypothese ne 
se laisse ni prouver ni refuter directement par les sources; elle resulte pot&ant coherente et 
feconde pour I’interpretation des documents existants. o 1990 Academic press, hc. 
Gewohnheitsgemti wird der griechische mathematische Terminus dynamis abwechselnd 
als “Quadrat” und “QuadratwurzellSeite” verstanden. Eine Ubersicht tiber die verschiede- 
nen Anwendungen des Ausdrucks und des verwandten Verbum d$nasthai bei Platen und 
Aristoteles und bei mathematischen Autoren von Eudemos/Hippokrates tiber Eukhd, Archi- 
medes und Apollonios bis Heron, Nikomachos und Diophantos zeigt jedoch, daR sie alle mit 
einem bekannten Begriff aus der babylonischen Mathematik vereinbar sind, niimlich dem 
Quadrat identifiziert durch (und dadurch such mit) seiner Seite. Es zeigt sich such, daJ3 eine 
“dynamis der Geometer” und eine “djnamis der Rechner” zu unterscheiden sind; dab 
erstere erst gegen Mitte des vierten Jahrhunderts v.u.Z. als technische Terminologie vollig 
standardisiert wird; und dag sie zur Zeit Euklids auBer in besonderen Verbindungen und 
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formelhaften Ausdrucken wieder verschwindet. Zusammen mit der begrifflichen Dberein- 
stimmung zwischen den babylonischen und griechischen Termini deuten eine Reihe von 
gemeinsamen alltagssprachlichen Konnotationen darauf hin, dag der griechische Begriff von 
der nahostlichen Mathematik angeregt oder tibernommen worden ist. Diese Vermutung lal3t 
sich aus den Quellen weder endgtiltig beweisen noch widerlegen; sie ist aber nicht nur 
kohlrent, sondem such fruchtbar fur die Interpretation des gesamten Quellenmaterials. 
0 1990 Academic Press, Inc. 
Among the most debated single terms of ancient Greek mathematics is the 
word d$zamis [I], the basic everyday meaning of which is “power,” “might,” 
“strength,” “ability,” etc. [GEL 452a-b]. Responsible for this debate are first of 
all the paradoxical ways in which Plato uses the term in Theaetetus, especially 
because these appear to disagree with Euclid’s use of the term in the Elements. 
The word is absent from Books I through IX of the Elements. In Book X, 
Definition 2, however, we read that straight lines (E~%.&!L) are “commensurable 
in respect of djnamis @W&EL U$+EQ-~OL) whenever the squares on them (& &r’ 
c&&v W-&WV(Y) are measured by the same area.” This indicates that djnamis 
should be read as “square,” while raising the problem of why it is used instead of 
the current term tetragon. 
In Plato’s Theaetetus, a “d$namis of three feet” ([~~~v(YPLs] +rrous) appears to 
be a square with an area of 3 square feet (147d 3-4) [2]. A little bit later, however, 
djnamis is the term chosen for certain fines (~pappxi)-uiz., lines which “square 
off” (TETP(YYWV~[ELV) nonsquare numbers (anachronistically expressed, lines the 
lengths of which are surds). The latter use of the word has given rise to the other 
traditional interpretation of the word, as “side of square” or “square root”-at 
times as “irrational square root.” 
A third text has often been taken into account in these discussions. In Eudemos’ 
account of Hippocrates of Chios’ investigation of the lunes (as quoted by Simplicios 
[Thomas 1939, 2381) it is stated (in words which are often taken to go back to 
Hippocrates himself) that similar circular segments have the same ratios “as their 
bases in respect of d$namis” (K& cxi @ixws a6rOu 8uv&.w), while circles have 
the same ratio “as the diameters in respect of dinamis.” The Euclidean dative 
form dyna’mei is thus found (with approximately the same meaning) in a text dating 
back to the fourth or maybe even the fifth century. 
FURTHER OCCURRENCES: THE EARLY EPOCH 
In this paper, I intend to show that the apparently equivocal use of the term 
need not be considered equivocal after all in light of an analogous conceptual 
structure in Babylonian mathematics. Before presenting this parallel I shall, how- 
ever, give a more precise survey of the mathematical usages of the Greek term, in 
order to uncover more fully its context and development. 
There are, indeed, a number of less frequently discussed occurrences of the 
term and of the related verb djnasthai (&&a~%~; non-technical meaning “to be 
able/strong enough (to do something),” “ to be worth,” “to be able to produce,” 
etc. [GEL 451b-452”). As a preliminary (semantically uncommitted) translation 
HM 17 DYNAMIS 203 
integrating connotations of physical power as well as commercial value, I shall use 
“be worth” when discussing the mathematical uses of the verb. Instead of the 
expression “in respect of dy’namis” I shall mostly use the Greek dative dyna’mei. 
The verb is used in close connection with the noun in the central Theaetetus 
passage (148a6-b2): 
THEAETETOS. We defined all the lines that square off equal-sided numbers on plane surfaces 
as lengths, and ail the lines that square offoblong [i.e., nonsquare-JH] numbers as dyndmeis, 
since they are not commensurable with the first sort in respect of length but only in respect 
of the plane figures which they are worth. 
This translation reproduces McDowell as quoted by Burnyeat [1978, 4931, with 
these exceptions: “dyndmeis” is used instead of “powers”; “are worth” instead 
of “have the power to form”; and “in respect of length” instead of “in length,” 
in order to render the parallel uses of the dative forms 8~61~~~ and ~+~K.EL. It can 
be seen that the lines which are labelled dyndmeis “are worth” those squares of 
which they are the sides (anachronistically: The line of length fi “is worth” the 
square of area 3). 
In the Eudemos/Hippocrates fragment, the diameter d, of one circle is said to 
“be worth” the sextuple of another circle of diameter d2 when it “is” its 
sextuple dyna’mei, i.e., when d12 = 6d2* (24g5 and 2505 combined); the diameter of 
a circle, being the double of the radius “in length” @<K&L) is its quadruple dyna’mei 
(250“). Furthermore, the two short sides in a right-angled triangle “are worth the 
same” (;‘aov) as the hypotenuse (250’), while a line a is said to “be worth less” 
than two others b and c when a2 < b* + c2 (2424). 
In Aristotle’s De incessu animalium 708b33-709a2, on the other hand, the hypote- 
nuse of a right-angled triangle is said to “be worth” (not “worth the same as”) 
the two other sides [3]; according to Heath ([1949, 2841 against [GEL 452V4-451 
following the Oxford translation), the same usage is meant in 7OY18-22. An 
identical formulation of the Pythagorean theorem is found in the pseudo-Aristote- 
lian De lineis insecabilibus 97Oa12-14. 
In connection with a general discussion of “potency” and “potent” (~SV(Y~LS 
and &.~var~s, respectively), Aristotle explains in Metuphysica 1019b33-34 that the 
term d$namis is used in geometry “by metaphor”; in 1046”6-8 he explains the 
usage as due to “resemblance” (&oLc+). An explanation of the concept as 
derived from Aristotelian (or older natural) philosophy should thus be ex- 
cluded-even though a metaphor along the lines of “the square which a line is 
able to produce” would perhaps not be far from Aristotle’s own understanding of 
the term [4]. 
The examples given so far demonstrate beyond a doubt that djnamis and d4;- 
nasthai belong to accepted fourth- (and maybe fifth-) century geometrical par- 
lance. They might also suggest that the use of djnamis in Theaetetus as a designa- 
tion for a line (be it a specific sort of line) is a Platonic hint of an idiosyncrasy of 
the young Theaetetos-as suggested by Burnyeat [1978, 4961. 
The first of these theses is confirmed by another Platonic passage, while the 
second is falsified (puce Bumyeat). Politicus 266a-b contains a pun on the word 
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(already discussed by Burnyeat [ 1978,496] and by Szabo [ 1969,903): Man, having 
the ability (&zamis) to walk on two feet (being “of two feet in respect of ability”/ 
Gi~oup Guudr~c~) is identified with the diagonal [of the unit square], which is also 
“two feet dyna’mei.” Similarly, the swine, being four footed in respect of ability, 
is the “diagonal of the diagonal” (being of four feet dyn&nei it must be of length 
2, and so be the diagonal of a square with side fi). We observe that the “human” 
diagonal is regarded in the second instance as something possessing itself a diago- 
nal, i.e., as a square, in a way which defies both the interpretation of the dq’namis 
as a square pure and simple and the traditional alternative “side”/“square root.” 
Because Theaetetos and “the young Socrates” participate together in the dia- 
logue as they do in Theaetetus, Burnyeat interprets the passage as another refer- 
ence to Theaetetos’ characteristic idiom. The pun is, however, put forward by the 
“Stranger from Elea,” and furthermore with the words “since both of you are 
devoted to geometry.” Had Plato wanted to hint at Theaetetos’ own terminological 
contributions or habits he would hardly have chosen this way to express himself. 
Instead, the pun must be a play on the familiar and shared terminology of geometers 
of the period (or, rather, a terminology which a mid-fourth century philosopher 
would find natural in the mouth of a late fifth-century geometer). 
FURTHER OCCURRENCES: THE EPOCH OF MATURITY 
As is well known, almost all sources for the history of Greek mathematics 
date from the third century B.C. or later. Truly, in this age of maturity Greek 
mathematicians tended to make less use of the djnamisldjnasthai structure than 
their forerunners appear to have done in the period from Hippocrates to Eudemos. 
Still, both terms occur a number of times in the great mathematical authors from 
Euclid onward, and in ways which may serve to elucidate the terminology, reveal- 
ing continuity with earlier usages of varying character. 
In Data 64, 65, and 67, Euclid speaks of the amount by which one side of a 
triangle “is worth” more or less than the other two sides, with the same meaning 
and in the same connection as Hippocrates/Eudemos. In the ensuing demonstra- 
tions, however, he only refers to “the tetragons on” the sides. The same thing 
occurs in Proposition 86. It appears as if the d$namisldjnasthai usage had been 
current at a time (fifth and fourth century) when certain theorems and standardized 
expressions were first formulated (the point in question here being the extended 
Pythagorean theorem), and that those formulations were handed down faithfully 
[5]. But the actual proofs of the Data were formulated in the current terminology, 
which spoke of tetragons and not dyndmei. 
Stronger evidence for a changing usage is seen in the Elements. Here the d9namis 
is avoided even in the formulations of the theorems until Book X. So, the Pythago- 
rean theorem, which both Eudemos/Hippocrates and the Aristotelian corpus refer 
to time and again but in dq’nasthai dress, deals here with “the tetragons on” the 
sides (1.47). The same holds for X11.2, in which “circles are to each other as the 
tetragons on their diameters,” whereas Eudemos/Hippocrates had spoken of the 
ratio “between the diameters dyncimei.” 
In Books X and XIII we find the traditional usage-but only in definitions, in 
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theorems, and in proofs referring to definitions or theorems or (in a few cases) 
summing up a result in formulaic language. During the free discursive argumenta- 
tion on figures, all references are to “the tetragons on” the lines in question. X, 
Definition 2, which was quoted above, explains the formula “commensurability 
dynbmei” of two straight lines as “commensurability of the tetragons on” the 
lines, and can thus be taken as a paradigm for the general relation between formulae 
and free speech. 
The formulae which are used belong without exception to types with which we 
are already familiar from earlier sources. We find the counterposition of “commen- 
surability in respect of length” (&CCL) and dyncimei (e.g., X, Definition 3); line a 
“being worth more” than line b (e.g., X.14), “being worth II times” b (e.g. X111.2), 
or line a “being worth” lines b and c (e.g., X111.10). Finally, a line may “be 
worth” an area (e.g., X.40) or a figure (e.g., XIII. 1). 
On the faith of Proclos, Archimedes is normally taken to have worked after 
Euclid. As observed by Schneider [1979, 61f, n. 821 and Knorr [1978,221], how- 
ever, his works build on pre-Euclidean mathematics and not on the Euclidean 
Elements; as a witness of early terminology, he can thus be considered on a par 
with Euclid. 
Archimedes’ use of the djnamisld~nasthai terminology varies from work to 
work-a fact which was used by Knot-r as supplementary evidence in his investiga- 
tion of the relative chronology of the Archimedean corpus [I978 264, n. 124a]. 
Most of the occurrences fall under the types also attested to in Euclid: ratio 
dyndmei in contrast to ratio simpliciter or me’kei, and a line “being worth” a 
rectangle or a plane figure. At times, however, a line “is worth the same” as a 
rectangle (e.g., De sphaera et cyfindro 1.29, 124’). Furthermore, there seems to 
be a tendency (according to Knot-r’s relative chronology) for earlier works to use 
occasionally the idiom in free speech and for late works to restrict it to formulaic 
expressions and quotations of established theorems. 
Like Euclid’s work, the Archimedean corpus thus suggests that the d$namisl 
djnasthai usage was left behind in the free language of third-century geometers 
but was preserved (and still used) in a frozen state in formulaic expressions. This 
is further confirmed in Apollonios’ Conica, with one qualification: Apollonios takes 
advantage of the possibilities of the terms to compress complicated expressions, 
creating formulae of his own (e.g., 111.54, 44015, where a ratio is composed from 
one ratio dyndmei and another ordinary ratio between areas). 
Later geometers would still use the formulae but only by tradition. This is 
demonstrated by Pappos, in whose Mathematical Collection (along with some 20 
corrected quotations of the old formulations) the d$namis and tetragon formulations 
of the Data are mixed up as “the dyndmeis of the sides of the triangles” (638”-13). 
Direct and indirect testimony is supplied by an anonymous 2nd century A.D. 
commentary to Theaetetus [Burnyeat 1978,497]: It tells that “the ancients called 
tetragons dyncimeis”; evidently, the readers were supposed not to know-and the 
commentator for his part seems not to know that the two terms, though somehow 
semantically connected, had been used differently. 
It is then no wonder that even Hero speaks of ratios dyndmei vs. me’kei in 
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Metrica 1.19, 54’*-nor that a passage of I.34 (8228f) appears to make a rectangle 
and not a line the subject of the verb d$nasthai (appears, since the passage is 
anyhow illegitimately elliptic and therefore possibly corrupt [6]). At other points, 
however, striking deviations from familiar expressions turn up. A passage in I. 15 
(4222-25) runs “and take away from dynbmei 121 dyncimei 36, remainder dyna’mei 
25, which is me’kei 5.” Dyndmei 121 is thus simply m = 11, which in a more 
traditional formulation might appear as “that which dynamei is 121,” correspond- 
ing also to the expression “BO dyna’mei 180” found three lines above (freely to 
be interpreted B@* = 180 or BO = V’%%). But the phrase in lines 22-24 contains 
none of those articles and relative pronouns which in normal Greek mathematical 
texts indicate elided words. Dynrimei N is simply used for V%. 
If we go to I. 17, 48Sf, on the other hand, “the ratio of the (tetragon) on d$namis 
BI to the (tetragon) on BIY, together with the (tetragon) on AA” designates the 
ratio of B14 to BI* - AA2. Dy’numis N is thus N2. So, the Platonic ambiguity 
between “square” and “square root” turns up again in this rather late and very 
un-Platonic text (though grammatically distinguished as it should be in an efficient 
technical terminology). 
THE “CALCULATOR’S D YNAMIS” 
The B14 of Metricu I.17 is also spoken of as “the dynumod9numis upon BY 
(4g2’), Diophantos’ term for the fourth power. It might therefore seem that the 
numerically oriented mathematicians of later antiquity merely embraced a tradi- 
tional geometrical concept and shaped it for their own purposes. I shall call this 
concept (that of Hippocrates, Euclid, Archimedes, Apollonios and Pappos) the 
“geometers’ d9numis,” in agreement with the passages from Metuphysicu and 
Pofiticus quoted above. More likely, however, the similarities between Plato’s and 
Hero’s texts should be explained with reference to an old, related but distinct 
“calculators’ djnumis.” To this point I shall return; for the moment I shall only 
argue for the existence of the entity in question. 
It turns up rather explicitly in Plato’s Republica 587d, during the discussion of 
the distance between the tyrant’s phantasmagoric pleasure and real pleasure, 
which, when regarded as “number of the length” (roti pfj~ous C&X@&), is argued 
by Socrates to be the “plane number” 3 * 3 = 9. It is then “clear, in truth, how 
great a distance it is removed according to d$zumis and third increase” (KaT& 
i%vap~ KCY~ ~piq~ aQ[q)v)-a statement upon which Glaucon comments: “clear 
at least to the calculator” (GrjXo~ r(;, YE hoyumLK&). In this gently ironic portrait 
of his brother [7] Plato evidently supposes that the mathematically illiterate will 
have known the word d$numis as belonging to the field of practical calculation 
(logistics) rather than to that of theoretical geometry. Furthermore, logistics is 
supposed by Socrates’ remark to deal with three different numerical manifestations 
of one and the same entity, as “number of the length,” d$numis, and “third 
increase.” As if to avert misunderstanding, Plato tells us that these are not just the 
“linear,” “square,” and “cube numbers” known from Greek theoretical arith- 
metic (and from Theuetetus), the “number of the length” being already a square 
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number; they correspond instead to the first, second, and third power of the 
entity. 
Presumably, the “calculators’ d$namis” is also mentioned in Timaeus 31c-32a 
[8]. At most, however, this passage provides us with the extra information that the 
terminology for the “third power” vacillated. More interesting as an elucidation of 
the Republica passage and of the “calculators’ d$namis” are the terms used in 
Diophantos’ Arithmetica. As he explains in his foreword, Diophantos speaks of 
square and cube numbers as “tetragons” (TET@~WVOL) and “cubes” (K@oL), 
respectively (2 . I%**) In agreement with general convention, however, the second 
and third power of the unknown number (the &p&&) are spoken of as d$namis 
(G&xY~Ls, abbreviated AY) and cube (&/30sIKy) (415-17) 191. Now, it is known that 
part of Diophantos’ algebraic formalism is taken from earlier Greek calculators: 
the abbreviation 5 for the &p~0& is used in a ca. 1st century (A.D.) papyrus (see 
[Robbins 19291 and [Vogel 19301) and the term 6uva~o89va~~s for the fourth 
power was used during the same century by Hero (cf. above). Furthermore, 
part of Diophantos’ material (I.xvi-xix, xxii-xxv) is borrowed from traditions of 
recreational mathematics (“purchase of a horse,” “finding a purse,” etc.; see 
[Tropfke 1980,606-6131) which already in Plato’s time had given rise to theoretical 
treatments (“Thymarides’ flower”; see [Heath 1921, 94ff]). Since the distinction 
made between square number and dinamis coincides with that made in Republica 
587d, it appears reasonable to assume that even this is due to continuity, and that 
Diophantos’ “general convention” followed the old calculators known to Glaucon 
in its specific use of d$namis [IO]. 
If this is so, “geometers”’ and “calculators’ dy’namis” are of course related 
but yet different concepts, and one must be assumed to derive from the other. For 
the moment, we will have to leave open the question of the direction of influence, 
and return our attention to the geometers’ concept, which is better documented in 
the sources. 
INTERPRETING D YNAMZS 
The difficulty of explaining djnamis plainly as another name either for tetragon 
or for side is as evident as the difficulty of explaining away the evidence in favor 
of the rival explanation. Instead, two new interpretations (both involving centrally 
the verb djnasthai) have been proposed by Szabo and Taisbak. 
Taisbak [1980; summarized in 1982, 72-761 proposed a reading of djnasthai as 
“to master,” in the sense that a line “masters” that two-dimensional extension 
which it is able to cover by a square; this extension should be understood as an 
entity different both from the square as a geometrical figure and from its area 
regarded as a number resulting from mensuration. In its origin, djnamis should 
then be a term for the extension. For later times, Taisbak proposed a reduction to 
an ill-understood rudiment. The use of the term for a line should result from 
informal speaking among mathematicians. 
Szabb’s explanation [1969, 46f; reworked 19861 built on the well-documented 
use of d9nasthai as “being worth” in a real commercial sense (“the shekel is worth 
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7 obols”). This is supposed to have inspired a use expressing the notion that a 
square is equal to some other surface (a rectangle or a sum of squares); for some 
reason (“irgendwie” [1986, 359]), the expression involves the side of the square 
as the subject, and not the square itself. Formally, a dynamis should be a line; in 
reality, however, it should denote the square constructed upon the line, but only 
on condition that this square is equal to another surface. 
In order to underpin his interpretation, Szabo claimed that the KC& 69uap~u 
usage of the passages from Republica and Timaeus (in fact the earliest certain 
appearances of the mathematical djnamis) is derivative, while the dative dyntimei 
used from the late Platonic dialogues onward reflects the original thinking. Even 
if this hypothesis is granted, the rather loose language of the remaining pre- 
Euclidean sources is problematic for a strict reading of Szabo’s thesis-a line 
being sometimes worth other lines, sometimes “the same” as other lines, etc. If 
the thesis is read more loosely than originally intended, however, as informal 
speaking, neither the early Platonic occurrences nor the lax formulations are 
serious challenges; interpreted like this, on the other hand, the explanation comes 
closer to Taisbak’s. 
Before considering either of these positions. I shall step outside the circle of 
Greek language and culture. 
A BABYLONIAN PARALLEL 
To a historian of Babylonian mathematics, the apparent ambiguity between 
“square” and “square root” has a familiar ring. Both the basic Old Babylonian 
term for a geometric square (mit&rtum) and the Sumerogram normally translated 
as “square root” (t’bsi,) appear (when translated into modern terminology and 
concepts) to designate alternately the square and its side. The semantic basis of 
;b-si, is equality (viz., equality of the sides of a square), whereas that of mi@rtum 
is the confrontation of equivalents (still as sides of a square). Interestingly, the 
Babylonian term for “countervalue” or “commercial rate” (ma&rum) derives 
from the same root as mithartum, uiz., from ma@rum, “to stand up against, to 
encounter, to receive [an antagonist, an equivalent, a peer].” So, the linking of 
“square, ” “side of square, ” “commercial rate,” “equivalence,” and “confronta- 
tion of force, ” so puzzling in Greek mathematics, is shared with the mathematics 
of the old eastern neighbor. Could it be that the Greek term translates a borrowed 
technical concept, using a Greek term possessing the same connotational range as 
the original Semitic expression [ 1 l]? And could a possible borrowing, or simply 
the conceptual parallel, help us understand the nuances of the Greek term? 
Since our earliest sources (be it Plato or the Eudemos/Hippocrates fragment) 
use the d$namis terminology in developed form, the original idea behind it cannot 
be established beyond doubt, and conceptual and terminological diffusion (from 
Babylonia or, indeed, from anywhere) can be neither proved nor ruled out as a 
possibility. The answer to the first question is an uninteresting “yes-anything 
could be.” For the time being, the hypothesis can only be tested for plausibility 
and fruitfulness, the former depending largely on the latter, i.e., on the answer to 
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our second question. We shall therefore need to take a closer look at the Babylonian 
concepts. 
According to its derivation and to cognate terms, mit@rtum designates an entity 
arising from the confrontation of equivalents (the confrontation of the line and its 
m&urn or “counterpart’‘-another derivative from the same root). A number of 
texts show that the mit&tum, when a number is ascribed to it, is the length of 
the side and possesses an area [ 121. No single text can be found where the square 
is identified with its area, as we would tend to do, and as is inherent in the Euclidean 
tetragon as a “figure” (o+@), i.e., as something which is “encompassed by 
some boundary or boundaries” (IHI rwos ;i rwwv 6pwv ITE~LEX~~EVOV) (Elements 
I, Definitions 22 and 14). On the other hand, other evidence shows beyond a doubt 
that the mit&tum is a geometrical square and not a mere line adjacent to a 
square -e.g., BM 15285 [MKT I, 137f], where the squares are drawn. 
This may seem strange to us. From a culturally neutral standpoint, however, 
our own ways are equally strange. Why should a complex geometrical configura- 
tion-four equal lines at right angles delimiting a plane surface-be considered 
identical with the measure of the plane surface, rather than with the measure of 
one of the lines? Once the configuration is given, one parametrization is as good 
as the other. So, the ambiguity of the mithartum concept vanishes: it is not 
alternately square and square root, but simply the figure identified by-and hence 
with-its side. 
The case of if& is similar. Etymologically and in most occurrences the term is 
a verb. A phrase like “81-e 9 ib-si,” must apparently be read as “8 1 makes 9 equal- 
[sided]” [ 131. In some occurrences, the term is used as a noun related to mithurtum, 
i.e., as a square figure parametrized by the length of its side (at times when the 
side of a square of known area is asked for, but occasionally as a description of 
the geometrical configuration itself. And in still other instances, the term occurs 
as a verb denoting the creation from a length of the corresponding quadratic figure 
(but nor its area) [14]. Once again, the square is considered under the aspect of a 
figure made up of equal sides, not as a plane surface surrounded by such sides. 
THE “GEOMETERS’ DYNAMZS” 
With this in mind we now return to the Greek material-first to the concepts 
“commensurable in respect of length” (~$KEL cr@p~~poL) and “commensurable 
in respect of d$numis” (C%IV&~SL tippsrpoi) from Elements X, Definitions 2-3. 
Two straight lines (.&.&L [~pcq.+ai]) are commensurable “in respect of length” 
if they have a common measure when each is regarded without sophistication as 
a length-a pfj~os. They are commensurable “in respect of d$numis” when the 
tetragons on them have a common measure-that is, when the two lines themselves 
are commensurable if regarded in the Babylonian way, as representing squares. 
The common grammatical form (the dative) of pfj~e~ and &J&.LEL suggests that 
the two terms should stand in the same relation to the straight lines; since the line 
can indubitably be apprehended as a length, it should also be possible to apprehend 
it as a d$numis (and it should be seen so in “commensurability in respect of 
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&namis”). But the parallel leads still further. Since in the former case the lengths 
themselves have the common measure, in the latter case the dyna’meis must be 
the things measured (remember that the Greek measuring procedure is a process 
of covering or taking away, cf. the anthyphairesis). The dy’namis can hence hardly 
be anything but a mit&zrtum, a square identified with its side (but still of course 
possessing an area to which a measuring number can be ascribed). Otherwise 
expressed, the dy’namis is a line seen under the aspect of square. 
If instead of commensurability we had looked at ratio dyna’mei and me’kei, as 
known from Archimedes, the same arguments could have been developed. In both 
cases it becomes evident why we never find expressions like “commensurability 
in respect of tetragon” or “ratio in respect of tetragon”: tetragons themselves are 
commensurable (if they are) and in possession of a mutual ratio-they are not 
aspects of a line. The absence of such expressions also follows from Taisbak’s 
interpretation of the term; it is, however, somewhat enigmatic if “dq’namis” is 
believed to be nothing but another word for “tetragon.” Why, in fact, should 
Elements XII.2 when reformulating the Hippocratean theorem that circles have 
the same ratio “as their diameters dyndmei” also change the grammatical construc- 
tion if it had been meaningful to speak of ratios rcrpdIyo~y? Truly, grammatical 
habits might have changed over the centuries, but this would then affect both 
terms had they really been synonyms (as, in fact, we see in Pappos’ late mix-up). 
If we turn to Theaetetus, the first use of djnamis as a “square of three [square] 
feet” is of course in harmony with the interpretation of the term as a mit&w- 
turn-rpirovs, “of three feet,” is an adjective and hence not necessarily to be 
regarded as an identity, The later passage, in which the young Theaetetos intro- 
duces his definition distinguishing two sorts of lines (~p(~ppcxi), is more interesting: 
on the one hand, a line which can be “spoken of” as a length, i.e., a line the length 
of which can be measured by a rational number which can be used as its name, is 
called a “length,” a purj~os. On the other hand, a line which can only be “spoken 
of,” i.e., be given a numerical name, when regarded under its aspect of djnamis, 
is called a djnamis (it will be remembered that the Greek term which translates as 
“rational” is fir)&, meaning “which can be spoken”). 
According to the mitbartum interpretation, the definitions introduced by 
Theaetetos are no longer shocking, clumsy, or childish, as they have been regarded 
by various authors. Theaetetos does not call a square root a square, or anything 
like that. Truly, any line can be regarded in advance as a d$namis, and Theaetetos 
restricts the use of the term to such lines which in a certain sense are only to be 
spoken of as dynbmeis. This is, however, a precise analog of another well-known 
Greek dichotomy: some numbers are “square numbers”; they can be “engendered 
as equal times equal” (ib-ov ~&KLS yiyvea&& i.e., produced as the product of 
two equal factors. In principle, a “square number” is also “oblong’‘-it can be 
produced as the product of unequal factors: 4 * 4 = 8 -2; 3 * 3 = 9 . 1. The name 
“oblong number” (bp&&s mpop+~qs) is, however, reserved for such numbers 
which are only oblong, i.e., for nonsquare numbers. This delimitation, introduced 
by Theaetetos in the same dialogue just before the “shocking” definitions of 
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“length” and “djnamis” (147e9-148a4), has never shocked anyone. Yet, accord- 
ing to the mitbartum interpretation, the logic of the two definitions is strictly the 
same. No puzzles are left. The passages from Theaetetus, as well as the entire 
material on the “geometers’ &namis,” fit the interpretation of the d$zamis as a 
concept of the same structure as the Babylonian conceptualization of the square. 
As already stated, the link between d$namis as commercial worth and as con- 
frontation of force is a feature shared with the Babylonian mithartum. No Babylo- 
nian mathematical term equivalent to d$nasthai exists, however. Nor does there 
appear to be any concept or procedure in Babylonian mathematics which necessi- 
tates such a word. So, even if the djnamis may be imported from or inspired by 
Babylonia, the term djnasthai appears to be a genuine Greek development due to 
the integration of the dy’namis concept into the theoretical structure of Greek 
geometry. We see in Theaetetus 148b2 a possible explanation for such a develop- 
ment, when Plato speaks of “the plane figures” which the lines dinantai, i.e., 
“have in their power to form when seen dyna’mei” or “are worth” under the same 
aspect. This could also be the metaphorical sense which Aristotle in Metaphysics 
1019b33f, and it suggests that the Greeks may have conceptualized the term in 
Taisbak’s manner in the mid-fourth century (and perhaps earlier), independently 
of its origin. This, in connection with the verb’s connotations of equivalence and 
being worth, could then easily lead to the general loose usage in which lines or 
surfaces (Hero!) can be said to d9nasthai other lines or surfaces, but where in all 
cases the equality involved is one of surfaces, not of lengths. 
On the other hand, the djnamis might also stand for a mitbartum-like concept 
without having been borrowed at the conceptual level. Both concepts could have 
developed independently on the basis of analogous or shared measuring practices 
[15]. In this case, the shared secondary connotations of the two terms must be 
considered accidental (which, given the connotative richness of both languages, 
could easily have happened). 
THE “CALCULATORS’ DYNAMIS” REVISITED 
Thus, if we restrict our reflections to the “geometers’ djnamis,” conceptual 
borrowing and independent development of analogous conceptualizations of the 
square figure are equally good causal explanations of the apparent mitbartum- 
structure of the Greek concept. This, however, brings us to the question of the 
“calculators’ d$namis.” If, as was argued, Greek calculators may plausibly have 
been in possession of second-degree algebra showing terminological continuity up 
to Diophantos, it can hardly have been an indigenous development: it would have 
been inspired (or, more probably, imported) from some Middle Eastern algebra 
descending from the Old Babylonian tradition. Now, I have shown elsewhere that 
Old Babylonian “algebra” cannot have been arithmetical, i.e., conceptualized as 
dealing with unknown numbers organized by means of numerical operations [ 161. 
Instead it appears to have been organized on the basis of “naive,” nondeductive 
geometry of a sort related to that used by al-Khwarizmi in his Algebra to justify 
the standard algorithms used to solve basic mixed second-degree equations (see 
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[Rosen 1831, 13-211, or one of the published Medieval Latin translations, e.g., 
[Hughes 1986, 236-241]), but of course without al-Khwarizmi’s Greek-type letter 
symbolism. Since the Arabic treatise mentioned in note 11 was of a similar sort, a 
descendant which inspired Greek calculators can hardly have been much different. 
Even early Greek “calculator-algebra” will consequently have dealt with “real” 
lines and squares, not with sums and products of pure numbers [17]. Truly, the 
“real” lines and squares may have been rows and patterns of pebbles on an abacus- 
board, rather than the continuous lines of a drawing-cf. below. 
At the same time, the branch of Old Babylonian mathematics in which mitbartum 
and fb-si, occur most frequently is the so-called “algebra.” So, if a conceptual 
import into Greece has indeed taken place, the plausible channel is “calculator- 
algebra” rather than theoretical geometry. This would make the “calculators’ 
dqnamis” the primary concept from which the “geometers’ djnamis” would be 
derived. 
Hero’s curious phraseology (“dynkmei 25, which is me’kei 5”-cf. above) might 
then derive from this calculators’ tradition rather than from his Archimedean 
affiliation. It belongs indeed with a numerical calculation. As in Republica 587d, 
the same concrete entity is represented by several numbers; and as in the second 
passage from Theaetetus, the mathematics of the passage suggests the translation 
“root.” If the segregation of a geometrical d$namis was only taking place during 
Plato’s (and Theaetetos’) youth, these specific parallels between Plato and Hero 
are probably manifestations of the closeness of both to the calculators’ usage. 
If, on the other hand, the djnamis-concept was indigenously developed, we 
would rather expect its origin to belong with geometry and mensuration. This 
would make the “calculators’ d$namis” a metaphor, and suggest that, in spite of 
its dependence on prescientific sources and methods, logistics had already come 
under the sway of scientific mathematics in respect of metaphorics and conceptual- 
izations around 400 B.C. If one reflects on the balance between references to 
logistics and to the purer branches of mathematics in the earlier part of the Platonic 
corpus (including Republica and Timaeus), this seems highly improbable. 
THE DYNAMZS OF FIGURATE NUMBERS 
Furthermore, seeking the origins of our term in logistics rather than theoretical 
geometry also better fits its use in the “Pythagorean” theory of figurate numbers. 
Here, indeed, the word dinamis turns up in a way which could well be related to 
its use in a “pebble-algebra” but not to its geometrical function. 
By “pebble-algebra” I refer to a possible representation of a second-degree 
“algebra” in Babylonian style by means of pebbles on the abacus board. Indeed, 
a person who says “calculator” in a Greek context says “pebble” or $+jr$op-the 
main tool of the calculator being the abacus with appurtenant pebble calculi. It is 
also a well-established fact that the “doctrine of odd and even,” as well as the 
whole theory of figurate numbers, grew out of the patterns in which pebbles could 
be arranged (cf. [Lefevre 19811). It is therefore natural to assume that if some 
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calculator algebra was in use in classical Greece it was performed (exclusively or 
occasionally) with pebbles on the abacus board [HI. 
This observation is interesting for several reasons. First, the interest in figurate 
numbers (including the “square” and “oblong” numbers spoken of by Theaetetos) 
ceases to be the result of some play with abacus pebbles irrelevant to their normal 
use. Square, gnomonic, and oblong numbers occur naturally as soon as one tries 
to represent a mixed second-degree problem on the board. So, e.g., the problem 
x + y = 8, x * y = 15 is represented and solved thus: 
A B C D 
n n n n n WBrnrn n wmw n n n n n 
rnDHUrn 3 n n n n j n n n n rs n mmmw 
n n n n n n n n n n n n n n mmmw 
rn8rn n mm0 
The virtual starting point for the analytical procedure is a pattern of 15 pebbles 
(A), whose length and width taken separately are unknown, whereas the sum of 
the length and the width is known to be 8. In the real process of solution we 
therefore start by.laying out a gnomon with S/2 = 4 pebbles in each leg, and fill 
out the inside until all 15 pebbles have been used (B). This shows that a square of 
1 . 1 = 1 pebble is lacking in order to complete the square (C), and that hence 1 
row has to be moved from bottom to the right in order to actualize the virtual 
rectangle (D) [ 191. 
Apart from the occurrence of oblong, gnomonic, and square numbers (all basic 
entities in the theory of figurate numbers), we see that one of the basic theorems 
of the theory follows immediately from the procedure--viz., that the sum of the 
first IZ odd numbers equals n*. Even the triangular numbers and the theorem that 
the sum of two consecutive triangular numbers is a square number are seen from 
the figure, although these observations play no role in the process. As soon as one 
starts reflecting on the patterns, these triangular numbers and their properties, as 
well as those of the gnomonic, square, and oblong numbers, lead to a series of 
obvious questions [20]; the theory of figurate numbers emerges as a theory dealing 
with the general properties of existent tools and practices instead of being an idle 
play picked up from nowhere. 
Second, an astonishing use of the term d$namis in Pythagorean or Neopythago- 
rean arithmetic becomes meaningful. In configuration C, the mithartum-djnamis 
is evidently 4. This is the line which “squares off” the complete pattern in 
Theaetetos’ words. Now, the term turns up in Nicomachos’ Introduction to Arith- 
metic in a way which could easily be explained as a generalization of this usage 
but which is otherwise anomalous. If we look at configuration A, we see the 
number 15 being arranged in thirds-according to Nicomachos in parts which “by 
name” (&&(YTL) are 3 and dyncimei (or KC& 6tivapLv-both forms are used) are 
5 (see, e.g., I.viii.7, 16’1). This is no far-fetched transfer of the meaning in C, even 
though contact with the geometrical meaning is lost. 
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Other 1st or 2nd century (A.D.) doxographic sources suggest that the usage is 
not a Nicomachean idiosyncrasy. They concern one of the central Pythagorean 
concepts, the tetrucfys or decade drawn up as a triangular number: 
According to Aetius (Placita 1.3.8), the Pythagoreans “declare . . . that the dj- 
namis of ten is in four, and in the tetrad” (T&V %~a . . . c#qu.iv, 4 6tivapis hmv 
.$v rois rCoo(~pcr~ ~ai Fiji ~&Q-P&&) (Fragment 58 B 15 (Diels 1951 I. 544’1). Taken 
in itself this phrase is ambiguous, and could well mean that the power of the 
magical number 10 resides in its possible triangular arrangement as tetructys. 
Hierocles, however, is more explicit in a commentary to supposedly early Py- 
thagorean writings, stating that “the djnamis of the decad is the tetrad” (6s 8~ 
C%K~~~OP GXY~ULP 4 r&7&) ([Mullach 1875 I, 464B], quoted from [Souilhe 1919, 
231). So, these two doxographers (who will hardly be suspected of innovative 
mathematical terminology) appear to refer to a generalization of the concept of 
djnamis different from but very close to that of Nicomachos: once more, the 
“base” of a nonsquare figurate number is taken as its characteristic parameter and 
given the name djnamis belonging originally to the same parameter in the case of 
a square figurate number. 
FURTHER OBSERVATIONS 
Can we get any nearer to the process, or has the meager material now been 
exhausted? We can, in fact, squeeze the sources somewhat harder, observing that 
the two “intermediate” Platonic dialogues contain the expression KC& 86vq.uv; 
whereas the late dialogues (Theaetetus, Politicus) as well as all other authors 
(except the nongeometrical Nicomachos) invariably use the simple dative dynbmei. 
This suggests that the technical use of the term was only crystallizing in Plato’s 
later years, around the mid-fourth century; by then, on the other hand, a fully 
technical “geometers’ dynamis” was crystallizing. 
First, this observation makes it seem highly doubtful that Hippocrates’ own 
words are rendered exactly in the Eudemos fragment, which agrees so perfectly 
with the style of late Platonic, Aristotelian, and Archimedean occurrences [21]. 
The fragment seems rather to contain Eudemos’ reformulations in his own phrase 
structures of Hippocrates’ ideas, concepts and basic terms (including probably 
some forms of djnamis and d$nasthai). This conclusion is independent of all other 
hypotheses on the meaning and origin of our terms. 
Second, cautious assumptions on the temporal distance between the introduc- 
tion of a mathematical terminology and its crystallization in fixed linguistic forms 
(viz., the assumption that in an interactive environment this distance should be of 
the order of one or two generations of masters and students) support our earlier 
conclusion that the segregation of a distinct “geometers’ d$namis” from a naive- 
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geometric or pebble-based calculators’ concept occurred during Plato’s youth or 
shortly before. A central role could then perhaps be ascribed to Hippocrates and 
Theodoros. 
An observation made by Neuenschwander [1973, 329ffl may indicate in which 
connection the innovation took place. Time and again, the early books of the 
Elements use a principle which is neither proved nor stated as an axiom, viz., 
AB = CD e (AB)* = (CD)* 
Now, it follows from Neuenschwander’s analysis that when this principle is applied 
in Books II and IV, it is most often stated explicitly. When it is used in Books I 
and III, however, it remains implicit, except in 111.35-36; precisely these two 
propositions deal with areas of parallelograms, and their subject-matter is thus 
related to that of Book II. We may conclude that only the tradition behind Books 
II and IV, the “metrical tradition” dealing centrally with areas of plane figures 
and continuing itself in the theory of irrationals, based itself on a set of concepts 
making it natural to notice and formulate the application of the principle, which is 
nothing but the interchangeability of equality me’kei and dyncimei. This agrees 
perfectly with the hypothesis of a Near Eastern borrowing, because the branch of 
geometry which could be inspired by Babylonian “naive-geometric” algebra (or a 
Greek “calculators’ algebra,” for that matter) is precisely the so-called “geometric 
algebra” of Elements II (I shall not mix up the discussion of this much-debated 
term with the present investigation). It also fits well with the branches of geometry 
which later make use of the djnamis idiom: Elements X and XIII, etc. 
A final observation concerns the very idea of a “conceptual import.” Truly, the 
translation of dq’namis from mitbartum makes good sense of all occurrences of the 
term prior to Pappos. Still, the “geometers’ d$namis” belongs within a conceptual 
context differing fundamentally from that of the mitbartum: from the principle that 
the concepts of a connected body of thought are themselves connected we should 
therefore expect that the idea of a translation can only be approximately true. 
This is in fact borne out by closer analysis of some of our Greek texts. In the 
definition of “commensurability dyntimei” in Elements X, the entities which are 
explicitly measured by an area (x&pop) are the tetragons on the lines. Implicitly, 
however, the expression supposes that the lines regarded in their aspect of dy- 
ntimeis are measured (since the lines themselves are commensurable in that as- 
pect). Earlier, in the Eudemos fragment, bases and diameters themselves are said 
explicitly to have a ratio (viz., the ratio of the areas of their squares) under the 
same condition. This must mean that the area associated with a line regarded as 
a parametrization of a square figure is less of an external accessory than the area 
of a Babylonian mitbartum-the Greeks, apprehending the tetragon-square as 
well as circles and other plane figures as identical with their areas, tended to 
assimilate the d$namis-square into the same pattern [22]. In the case of the “calcu- 
lators’ d$namis” this becomes even more evident, since in Diophantos’s work 
d$namis has assumed the numerical role in his problems which the area (a-S d or 
eqlum) and not the mitbartum assumes in Babylonian texts. 
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Precisely this conceptual incongruity is probably the reason for the disappear- 
ance of the terms &namis and djnasthai from the active vocabulary of geometers 
by the early third century, except in specific technical niches (commensurability 
dynbmei) and formulaic expressions. The terms did not fit the mental organization 
of Greek mathematics once its various branches and disciplines blended into the 
melting-pot of Alexandrian learning. 
As to the term d$namis itself, it is clear that the connotational similarity with 
mitbartum does not reflect a borrowing of the Babylonian understanding of the 
square as a result of a confrontation of equals or counterparts. If not accidental, 
the shared connotations (involving physical force and commercial value) have to 
be explained at the level of the “folk etymology” (the “folk” in question being 
calculators or possibly geometers&-viz., as an attempt to understand why the 
Semitic masters called a “line regarded under the aspect of the appurtenant 
square” by a strange name related to the confrontation of values and force, a usage 
then reflected in the Greek term chosen to denote the same object. 
Such a pseudo-etymology may from the beginning have been connected with 
explanations proposed on the basis of the Greek language: the square which a line 
“has the power to form,” “is worth,” or “masters.” Such metaphors may also 
have been introduced as secondary explanations when memory of a foreign origin 
had been forgotten (which could have happened quickly). A “Babylonian” and a 
“Greek” interpretation of the term need not be mutually exclusive; in some way 
they probably supplement each other. 
CONCLUSIONS 
As stated by Berggren [1984, 4021, there are in the early history of Greek 
mathematics “sufficient documents to support a variety of reconstructions but an 
insufficient number to narrow the list of contending theories to one.” This pessi- 
mism is confirmed by the impossibility of reaching consensus on the merits of such 
great reconstructions as [Szabo 19691 and [Knorr 19751 [23]. For the time being, 
no compelling reconstruction can apparently be written; instead, further progress 
may be made through the construction of scenarios for all or parts of the develop- 
ment which may open our eyes to hitherto unnoticed features in the source material 
at hand. Such scenarios should be internally coherent and in agreement with 
available documents, and should be compared with rival interpretations of history 
on the basis of their merits in these respects; however, they need not claim in 
advance to be necessary truths. 
The above discussion, which includes an abundance of hypothetical formula- 
tions, is meant primarily to provide suggestions for such a partial scenario. Still, 
the knitting is not so tight that all parts of the argument stand or fall together; nor 
are they equally hypothetical. 
Among the positively supported results is the distinction between a “geometers’ 
dq’namis” and a “calculators’ djnamis.” Both groups made use of the term, but 
they did so for different purposes and within different conceptual frameworks, and 
hence necessarily in partially different ways-uide the quotations from Hero. Direct 
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evidence was also given for the assignment of the crystallization of the geometrical 
d$uzmis usage to Plato’s late years- and hence also for the doubt concerning the 
Hippocratean origin of the exact formulations in the Eudemos fragment. 
The interpretation of the geometrical d$namis concept as “a square identified 
by, and hence with, its side” is also supported by the sources regarded as a totality 
in the sense that the apparent ambiguities in the usage can only be surmounted by 
an interpretation of this kind. The possibility that such a concept can have been 
held is established through the mit@-turn-parallel. 
More hypothetical are the primacy of the “calculators’ dinamis” over the 
“geometers djnumis”; the interpretation of the early “calculators’ djnumis” as 
belonging with a naive-geometric or pebble-based “algebra”; the suggestion that 
the segregation of a distinct “geometers’ djnumis” is connected with the begin- 
nings of the theoretical tradition behind Elements II in the later fifth century; and 
the hypothesis that the djnumis is structurally similar to the mitlprtum because it 
is borrowed. Taken singly, these are nothing but possible hypotheses; together, 
they appear to form a plausible scenario fitting the complete available evidence, 
including evidence rarely taken into account (e.g., the finer details of Plato’s 
formulations in their chronology, the hidden presence and absence of the dynlimeil 
me’kei relation in Elements I-IV, and the peculiar Neopythagorean usage). 
Independent but secondary observations are the disappearance of the d$numis 
usage and its sole survival in formulaic language (which is not a new idea), and 
the explanation of this process in terms of the incongruity between the “d$numis- 
square” and the normal Greek conceptualization of squares and other plane figures 
as identical with the surfaces covered. 
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NOTES 
1. Extensive references to the debate prior to the year 1975 will be found in [Bumyeat 19781. Among 
later discussions of the term, [Knot-r 19751, [Taisbak 19801, and [Taisbak 19821 should be mentioned. 
2. Bumyeat [l978,492f] renders the whole passage 147~7 to 148d7 quoting John McDowell’s English 
translation, rendering Btivapbs as “power.” In the Loeb edition, Fowler [1921] translates the term as 
“root.” 
3. It should be kept in mind that the Greek verb is transitive; “x being worth Y” is thus as different 
from “X being worth the same as Y” as “x loving Y” is from “x loving the same as Y” (jealousy 
apart). 
4. Formulations like the latter are found in various commentators from late antiquity (see Bumyeat 
[1978, 500, n. 341. An explicit derivation from natural philosophy is considered “beyond doubt” by 
Barthlein [1%5, 451, who, substantiating his claim, mixes up lines and numbers in quite anachronistic 
ways. 
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5. Aujac [1984a, b] has investigated such word-by-word preservation of the phrasing of theorems, 
involving also Euclid and pre-Euclidean spherics. 
6. Hero cites Archimedes, De conoidibus et sphaeroidibus v, for the statement that “the N’A (rectan- 
gle) under the axes [of an ellipse] is worth the circleA equalA to the ellipse” [N = nominative case 
ending, A = accusative], but afterward uses the correct theorem that the product of the axes equals 
the square of the diameter of the circle in question. In a footnote, Heiberg proposes the correction 
“ . . . is worth (the diameteti) of the circle’ equalG . . .” [’ = genitive], which still takes the rectangle 
to be the subject of the sentence; the emendation “. is worth (the diametep) of the circleG equalG 
. . . “. however, would restore normal usage, apart from a legitimate though rather unusual inversion. 
7. The reading of the passage as benign irony is supported by the similar portrait of the jeunesse- 
dot@ attitudes of the other brother Adeimantos in 420a. 
8. SouilhC [1919, 1241 reads the passage differently, equating GCvawrs with “force” and 8~0s with 
“mass.” This is not very plausible in view of the context. This passage exhausts the number of 
mathematical occurrences of the dq’namis in the Platonic corpus, together with another passage in 
Timaeus (54b) where, in the triangle obtained by bisection of the equilateral triangle, one side is said 
to be the triple of the other ‘*according to dynamis” (Km& ~~)Y(Y~Lv). (I disregard a possible hint in the 
notoriously obscure Republica 546b. and the occurrences in the pseudo-Platonic Epinomis). 
9. As pointed out by Rashed [1984, 1131, the term dq’namis is introduced at an earlier stage than 
unknown numbers. Only by saying that “it has been approved” (E%oKL&(T~~)) that in this form the 
square of numbers becomes one of the “elements of arithmetical theory” (UTOLXE~OY 71)s &@~~TLK@F 
&&as), does Diophantos make clear that he is already here aiming at the only actual use of the term 
later on, viz., as a designation for the square of the unknown &pr0&. At the same time, he notes that 
he is following a general convention from a discipline of “arithmetical theory” which is neither 
Euclidean nor Neopythagorean (Nicomachos uses the term quite differently, as we shall see). Only 
Diophantos’ own brand of arithmetic seems to be left, i.e., algebra. 
10. Few instances of ancient second-degree “algebra” below the level of Diophantos have survived 
in sources from classical antiquity. Some, however, can be found scattered throughout surveyors’ and 
related texts. E.g., in the Geometrica ascribed to Hero, xxi 9-10 (38015”‘), the dimensions of a circle 
are found from the sum of diameter, perimeter, and area, while the Roman agrimensor Nipsus (2nd c. 
A.D?) treats the problem of a right-angled triangle with known hypotenuse and area in his Podismus 
(297f). We can hence be sure that basic second-degree “algebra” was indeed known to the ancient 
practitioners. 
11. Next to nothing is known about the transmission of Babylonian mathematics after the end of the 
Old Babylonian period (c. 1600 B.C.), but that transmission took place is sure. As I have shown in my 
[1986, 457-4681, a 12th-century Latin translation from the Arabic follows Old Babylonian ways down 
to the choice of grammatical forms. That the Greek calculators owed part of their technique to the 
Near East is also apparent from the name of their favorite instrument, the &ppat. the [dust] abacus, 
which is borrowed from western Semitic ‘b q, “light dust” (the root is absent in Babylonian). Since 
finally the term ma&rum is testified in Hebrew in the related form me&, a Western Semitic (Phoeni- 
cian?) contact is no less linguistically possible than direct Babylonian influence. 
Without taking Proclos’ Commentary more seriously than it deserves, we may also remember 
his ascription in 65j of “accurate investigation of numbers” (T~)v &p~OpLou &KPL~~T yvcjorc) to the 
Phoenicians, which he derives from the needs of logistics. 
12. E.g., BM 13901, passim [MKT III, l-51. The first problem can be translated: “I have added the 
area and my mitbartum, it is f.” The solution states that the mitbartum, the square identified with its 
side, is 4. 
13. This follows both from the Sumerian ergative suffix -e and from interrogative variants of the 
phrase showing 9 to be an accusative. Exemplifications can be traced through the glossaries of MKT. 
14. A full documentation of the varying uses of ib-si, would lead too far astray. It belongs with a 
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larger investigation of Babylonian “algebra” (work in progress; preliminary report in [Hoyrup 19841, 
final to appear in [Hoyrup 19901). 
15. I am grateful to Professor Tilman Krischer of the Freie Universitlt Berlin for pointing out the 
importance of this possibility in his comments on an earlier version of the present paper. 
16. Once more, documentation would lead too far astray-cf. note 14 above. The simplest part of 
the evidence comes from an analysis of the terminological structure of the texts. Two different 
“additive” operations are kept strictly apart in a way which has no meaning in an arithmetical 
interpretation, i.e., if the terms are synonyms for the one and only numerical addition. Similarly, two 
different “subtractions” and four different “multiplications” are distinguished. 
17. If  we take Plato’s testimony at its words, it suggests the same. The third power was spoken of 
as the “third increase,” which fits well with a spatial conceptualization but rather poorly with an 
arithmetical representation before the introduction of exponential symbolism or spatial representation. 
Arithmetically, we would have the number itself, the increase (i.e., the second power), and the second 
increase, i.e., our third power. 
18. Since the abacus appears first to have been borrowed in the form of a dust abacus from the Near 
East (I$. above, note 1 i), and since this device was used for geometric drawings throughout antiquity, 
occasional use of real drawings on a dustboard is also a possibility and in fact appears to fit Nipsus’ 
problem (see note 10) better than pebble manipulation. 
19. If  the problem had been x - y  = 2, x . y  = 15, we would start step B with the inner gnomon, 
the one with legs containing 2 pebbles, and add new layers at the outside. Apart from that, the same 
configurations would have to be used. Odd values ofx ? y, on the other hand, require further refinement. 
20. In his investigation of the prehistory of incommensurability, Knorr [1975, 142ffl comes to similar 
pebble-configurations and conclusions from another angle and deals with the matter in much more 
detail. 
21. The same doubt as to the literal precision of Eudemos’s quotation was recently formulated by 
Knorr [1986, 38f] on the basis of other evidence. 
22. Conversely, in its exact form the Greek concept could of course have no place with the Babylo- 
nians. A Babylonian line (and any other geometrical entity) is identified by, and conceptually not 
distinguished from its measuring number. A Greek line, however, is conceptually distinct both from 
the number of unit lengths contained in it when regarded as a length and from the number of unit 
squares covering it when regarded dyndmei. 
23. C’ also the review of a number of ongoing controversies in [Berggren 19841. 
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